April 20, 2021
U.S. Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), today questioned witnesses at a SASC hearing on the posture of United States Strategic Command and United States Space Command.
Witnesses included: Admiral Charles Richard, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and General James H. Dickinson, Commander, U.S. Space Command.
Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my office, when you talked about this, Admiral Richard, and I think you've covered it so well in your opening statement. I'm not sure what you might have left out, but you've done a great job. We know what Russia is doing. We know what they've been doing. We know what China has been doing. North Korea now is presenting a growing risk to the United States and our allies, and yet our nuclear forces are decades past their design lives and will need to be retired soon. So I just think it's important that when we are seeing our primary adversaries as outlined in our days, that we're not doing what we should be doing. We are actually behind our primary adversaries. And so I'd like to have you re-state: Russia, we know what they're doing. They've already modernized over 80 percent of its force, and China's nuclear programs are accelerating. So, I'd like to know, how important is it that we complete the U.S. nuclear modernization program as quickly as possible? You've outlined…where we are relative to our adversaries. But tell me how important it is that we do it now.
Richard: I'll start with, I want to expand on one point. I said in my opening statement that China could no longer be a lesser included case, and what that means is they're at the point that what it's going to take to deter them is going to start to be additive to what we have to do with Russia. I don't have the luxury of deterring one country at a time; I am expected to deter all countries, all of the time. And then on top of that, I don't have any remaining operational margin right there. We have exhausted the operational margin to allow us to delay this recapitalization as far as we went. I think it's important to remember that a lot of the quantities that we're talking about in these requirements were set many years ago when the threat level was actually much more benign than what we have seen now, and we have simply no—you're counting now on more and more things having to go right, and we're counting on more and more that we precisely understand the threat we're at, and that is a standard we have never allowed in our history to happen inside the strategic deterrent force. And then the final point is, we've never had to deter two opponents at the same time that are different. Most of our theory doesn't even account for that. We're working very hard on that, but that's why we have to have these capabilities in order to execute the direction the President gave me.
Inhofe: That's good. I know there are a lot of people that are leaning on our president — a lot of anti-nuke people that are wanting to minimize the concern that we have, that we're expressing today. One of the things is the “No-First-Use” policy. Now that's one that I can't remember one Secretary of Defense who doesn't share your view on the “No-First-Use” policy. I mean it's there, it's real. I think even Secretary Gates was quite outspoken in that area. Can you think of anyone who doesn't have that policy? One quick word then on “No First Use,” since that's going to come up — that's going to be very prominently portrayed and discussed — and what's your feeling on it?
Richard: Senator, what I would offer on this is, and I've testified to this effect before — look, the nation can have any policy it wants.
Inhofe: Yes, you did testify. You said, “My best military advice would be to not adopt a ‘No First Use’ policy.” You're strong on it.
Richard: Right, and I still stand by that statement, and here's why. One, we've already run an excursion of what that would do to strategic deterrence. It will diminish it. You will remove a level of ambiguity, now, that has a deterrent effect, short of employment of nuclear weapons — we won't have that anymore. That'll be mitigated by the fact that nobody's going to believe in any way, right? It won't be credible. We already have assurances that cover all but about 10 nations or so, half of which are allies, so you're only talking to folks who are probably not going to find it credible. It will have no more credibility than our current missile defense policies do. The catch is that some of the allies will believe it, so we'll have a corrosive effect on our assurance and extended deterrence commitments. I think commander of EUCOM, General Wolters, mentioned you'll get a mixed response. I think he's correct, but I don't see the upside to it, is my point. And so I continue to recommend we not adopt that.
Inhofe: Unfortunately, my time is expired but let me just ask you, General Dickinson. All these documents that we have here that directly address your area. Do you think that those, that the 2018 —that was back in 2018 — that the NDS still accurately assesses the strategic environment, as it pertains to space domain?
Dickinson: Senator, I do. I do in fact believe it does because space is a warfighting domain. We have seen the activities by our competitors, both Russia and China, as they've expanded their capabilities — in particular, China — in the space domain. We see their capabilities from direct ascent, ASAT — anti-satellite capabilities — to on-orbit activity that they've done with that capability, and we've seen the increase or proliferation of their directed energy efforts in terms of electronic warfare and in terms of jamming, as well as laser technology so I believe that it is absolutely a warfighting domain that we need to continue to work very closely with.
Inhofe: Thanks so much.
