WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), ranking member of the Senate Armed Services (SASC) Committee, today delivered the following opening statement at a SASC hearing entitled, “Reform of the Defense Acquisition System.” Witnesses at today’s hearing include Hon. Frank Kendall III, Under Secretary Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Department of Defuse; Mr. Michael Sullivan, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management Government Accountability Office; Mr. Jonathan Etherton, Senior Fellow for Acquisition Reform for National Defense Association; Mr. Moshe Schwartz, Specialist in Defense Acquisition Policy for Congressional Review Service; and Mr. David Berteau, Senior Vice President Center for Strategic and International Studies.

As prepared for delivery:       

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you for your leadership and many years of work on the issue of defense acquisition reform. 

In this era of diminished resources and rising national security threats, we must make every dollar count.  Cost overruns take away vitally needed equipment and capabilities from the warfighter.  For example, this year’s budget request cancels the Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (“GCV”).  This program was expected to provide 1,800 armored vehicles at a cost of $29 billion.  However, in the current fiscal environment, after spending $1.2 billion to develop the GCV, we are now told the program is unaffordable.  This is on top of the $19 billion spent on the service’s previous land warfare program called the Future Combat System, which was cancelled in 2009.  At a time when readiness rates are plummeting and we’re struggling to maintain a fleet of 11 carriers, such waste is totally unacceptable.     

Some progress to reform the system has been made, however.  The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, commonly called WASRA which was largely written by Chairman Levin and Senator McCain, has made important strides in this area.  Secretary Kendall’s Better Buying Power initiative and the reissuance of an interim DoD Instruction 5000.02 have also contributed to this effort.  

Despite these reforms, I remain deeply troubled by the massive bureaucratic hurdles our acquisition professionals must overcome.  For example, I have been informed in the case of one major defense acquisition program, it took 80,000 man hours to complete the paperwork to pass the first milestone of the defense acquisition system and an additional 100,000 man hours to produce the documentation to pass the second milestone. 

This is unacceptable. Our defense acquisition professionals need to be effectively managing their programs, not buried in unnecessary and wasteful paperwork.   I am pleased that Secretary Kendall has directed a review of the acquisition process weed out unnecessary bureaucracy. 

Last year I included a provision in the NDAA which directed the GAO to perform a similar review.  It is my hope that it will form the foundation for the defense acquisition reform effort that the Senate and House Armed Services have agreed to undertake next year. 

In addition, I am also very concerned about the training which is being afforded to our acquisition professionals.  In 2009, the Department of Defense conducted which is commonly referred to as the Fox/Ahern report.  This report polled senior military officers and civilians about the training they received in order to become program managers.  In a strikingly large number of areas fundamental to program management these senior officials stated their training was not “sufficiently practical and comprehensive.”  WASRA started to address this issue, however, to ensure sufficient progress is being made, I tasked the Department of Defense with redoing the Fox/Ahern report.  This report is due to be published in the next few weeks.  However, it is my hope that Secretary Kendall will be able to speak to some of the report’s preliminary findings.  If changes continue to be required in this area, I have no doubt, Mr. Chairman, we will be able to work together to achieve the necessary reforms. 

I am also very concerned about what the Air Force has called “personnel churn” in the management of acquisition programs.  For example, in the Air Force’s publicly released Acquisition Incident Review Team Final Report, it noted that the services’ failed Expeditionary Combat Support System or ECSS had a constant leadership turnover.  Understanding if this is part of a larger trend and if so devising a way to fix this problem is something I intend to address through legislation.  

Mr. Chairman now, more than ever, we must extract as much value as possible from each dollar spent on our nation’s defense.  If we do not, we will only be hurting the warfighter. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

# # #